Are Mental Properties Emergent Properties?

• Main Authors: Yao-Wen Hsieh, 謝耀文
• Other Authors: Allen Y. Houng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90322832511918435829

碩士 === 國立陽明大學 === 心智哲學研究所 === 101 === Emergent properties are the properties that arise out of basic entities yet are irreducible to them and meanwhile causally efficient. The discussions to regard mental properties as emergent properties are recently brought back to life because it would be a new hope for non-reductive physicalism. However, Jaegwon Kim has rejected the causal efficiency of emergent properties according to his supervenience argument, which denies an event can be overdetermined by both mental and physical causes. Thus, the emergence theory cannot stand on its ground by definition. In my thesis, I will point out several major flaws in Kim’s theory, and I will claim that Kim’s failure to reply to these problems is due to his ignorance to his own distinction between levels and orders. According to the definitions of levels and orders, I will develop my own causal theory, in which I distinguish epistemological causal relevance and ontological causal power. The former has explanatory power, but it could only be found in theories and the latter actually transfers among physical substances. In the end, I will discuss about the history and the definition of emergence theory. I will also claim that, according to a most complete version of emergence theory, the mental properties in my causal theory can be included in emergence theory. The remaining question of emergence theory is the mechanism of emergence, and I will give some suggestion for the future studies about how the mind emerges from complicated neural structures.