Summary: | 碩士 === 大同大學 === 事業經營學系(所) === 101 === Following the Financial Crisis in 1990, in recent years, the international oil and the price of raw material rising, sparked global financial crisis, which causes deterioration of inflation, the most companies to lead to a series of financial crises, after the United States to break out the subprime mortgage crisis since 2007, investment bank Lehman Brothers and General Motors are declared bankrupt, one after another, there are many banking and real estate also happened financial crisis, and in Taiwan, the Embezzlement of the Rebar Group and Cosmos Bank, and DRAM industry also break out the financial crises, this things have highlighted corporate governance is not perfect. After break out a series of the financial crisis of Multinational Corporation, the corporate governance’s point of view gets more attention.
Agency problems occur as a consequence of divisions between enterprise ownership and managerial authority. This study investigates the relation between the multi blockholders structure and firm value, and how to use the ownership structure to reduce agency problem, as well as from the point of view of corporate governance and ownership structure of relevance to understand the single largest blockholder or multi shareholders is better for the company.
The object of this study is using the listed companies in Taiwan, and from 2001 to 2012. Its analysis the correlation between the blockholder disperses and firm value, as well as the correlation between the blockholder presence, size and the firm value.
According to the regression analysis results obtained the following conclusions:
(1) When ownership is dispersive, it means among the shareholders will be mutual supervision, there by affecting firm value, which will get higher.
(2) The company has blockholder or shareholding of blockholder is higher, then firm value will get lower. If the company does not have the blockholders, the ownership is distribute between the shareholders, the shareholders will in order to self-interest to exercise the power of supervision, thus the firm value will increase.
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