| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 經濟學系 === 101 === This essay explains the many potential pay-offs in the society through cyclical structure.
By discussing the stability of cyclical structure, the essay finds the reasons for the consortium and collusion of player, and provides the incentives for players to collude in different situations.
This essay proves the condition of a stable cyclical structure.
This essay introduces two powers, one being decay: Which is to assume there will be some losses when passing on indirect effects. This exogenous variable discusses stability under various conditions.
The other power being heterogeneousness: Which discusses how the affects of players having different information would influence the stability of the cycle.
The results show that, in this cyclical structure, a odd number of players are more likely to be stable than a even number of players are.
The reason stems from unequal distribution.
When a player’s information quantity deviate, unequal distribution will make a even numbers of players stable in cases of a small number of people.
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