Honestly Preference Investment Subsidies on the Environment Impact and Auditing Policies

• Main Authors: Ren De Liao, 廖仁德
• Other Authors: Ruei Ji Guo
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/47356064906141828281

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 101 === In recent years, Industry to flourish, while on the environment caused great harm, In order to minimize the pollution caused by firm’s social costs, regulator must develop the relevant environmental quality control policies and optimal environmental audit policies to encourage firms to environmentally conscious investments. Previous studies have generally only considered self-interested rational firms, this study particularly preferred firms will be honest and self-interested rational firms while incorporating environmental policy environmental protection regulator consider, analyze its environmental investment subsidies and audit policies are. The author capture the following three conclusions through model analysis 1. The optimal audit policy of regulator Audit cost is small, honest and non-honest type firms are regardless of additional environmental investments were done or not done additional investment in environmental protection taken to deter auditing policies; go in the audit cost is large, for the honest and non-honest type firms who didn’t done additional environmental investments regulators to take deterrent auditing policies, and to engage in additional environmental investment firm does not perform any audit action; finally in the audit cost is quite large, based on honesty and non-honest type firms regardless of additional environmental investments were done or not done additional environmental investment neither conducted any audit action. 2. The optimal subsidy policy of regulator Audit cost is small; the regulators will tend to use environmental audit policy. With the rising cost of the audit, the regulators will depend on the results of cost-benefit analysis, taking appropriate environmental investment subsidies to compensate for the inadequacy of the audit policy. 3. The optimum environmental investment firm and clear decisions pollution This article assumes that preferences based on honesty firms do decontamination inevitable circumstances, non-honest firm will depend on honest regulators to decide whether the audit policy for pollution removal. In the firm’s environmental investment strategy, non-honest type will follow honest type firms to environmental investment decisions.