Other-regarding Preferences in Experimental Dynamic Volunteer’s Dilemmas
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 101 === Dynamic volunteer''s dilemmas have been modeled as individuals deciding whether to volunteer or not based on cost-benefit analysis, as in the war of attrition game. However, this analysis is usually carried out assuming self-interest, without ot...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Others |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2013
|
| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88497061569822303561 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 101 === Dynamic volunteer''s dilemmas have been modeled as individuals deciding whether to volunteer or not based on cost-benefit analysis, as in the war of attrition game. However, this analysis is usually carried out assuming self-interest, without other-regarding preferences. In this paper, we investigate the role of other-regarding preferences in dynamic volunteer''s dilemmas using lab experiments in which two players decide when to jump in and volunteer for the pair and contrast the results with a control treatment where subjects play against computers. We find that subjects are more likely to volunteer when dealing with the computer rather than with other participants. Our experimental data provide direct evidence that other-regarding preferences do play a critical factor in this problem, but through envy instead of altruism.
|
|---|