| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 101 === The main purpose of this research is to investigate the impacts of re-election of board on shareholder’s wealth. By using event study methodology to analyze share price for the sample companies selected from 2005~2007, this empirical research clarifies the informational effect of such contest from different dimensions, such as level of competition and the re-election results. Given that Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C amended the regulations of Rules Governing the Use of Proxies for Attendance at Shareholder Meetings of Public Companies in 2008, this study also applies the control group selected starting from 2008 to 2012 to study the impact of the amendment.
The empirical results show:
(1)In 2005 to 2007, the incidence of the contest of re-election of board is negatively related to shareholder’s wealth, and the negative return on share prices are positively related to contest intensity and the number of director sears seized by the dissident.
(2)In 2008 to 2012, the incidence of the contest of re-election of board is positively related to shareholder’s wealth, but not significant effect. Contest intensity and the number of director sears seized by the dissident are still positively related to the negative return on share prices.
Keywords: Re-election of board, Event study, Shareholder’s wealth, Rules Governing the Use of Proxies for Attendance at Shareholder Meetings of Public Companies, GARCH
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