Pay-for performance sensitivity and the impact of SOX Act：Evidence from the U.S. property and casualty insurance industry

• Main Authors: Wei-Wen Chen, 陳韡文
• Other Authors: 林姿婷
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/74357631489542959168

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 101 === This thesis investigates pay–for–performance sensitivity within the U.S. insurance industry and the impact of SOX Act on this sensitivity for casualty and property insurance companies (with different ownership structures) in the United States. In this study, I conduct the fixed effects regression analysis, and obtain the following results: First, changes in the amount of pay–for–performance sensitivity will be higher when the board’s proportion of outside directors is greater than 75%. Second, when the board’s proportion of outside directors is more than 85%, there is positive impact on the pay–for–performance sensitivity due to the SOX Act. Finally, there is significantly positive impact on the mutual companies which are regulated by the SOX Act.