An Optimal Subsidy Strategy of Manufacturer by Considering Distributor Providing Repair Service

• Main Authors: Yu-Han Huang, 黃玉涵
• Other Authors: Ruey-Shan Guo
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38238951188057715238

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 工業工程學研究所 === 101 === Green supply chain (GrSC) has been receiving increasing attention in recent years. As remanufacturers needs more supply of used products, the economic incentive is required to attract customers to return their used products. This study investigates the optimal subsidy and pricing policy of a manufacturer in the green supply chain, suggesting that the flow of returned items is variable, and is affected by the amount of subsidy provided by the manufacturer. Moreover, this study considers a distributor who sells the usable products, purchased from the manufacturer, and repaired products, produced by the distributor, to the customers at the same time. A two-stage game model is proposed to derive the optimal pricing policy of the manufacturer, considering the interaction between a manufacturer and a distributor within the context of price competition. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to discuss how manufacturer’s and distributor’s profit will be influenced by consumer valuation, return rate and the cost ratio of new product to remanufactured product.