| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 101 === This paper studies patentee's optimal licensing contract under asymmetric information. In this paper, asymmetric information means that the licensor does not know licensee's marginal cost after licensing whose process innovation. Given Cournot competition and asymmetric information, this paper discusses two cases. In case 1, we assume that licensee's marginal cost after licensing is great than or equals licensor's marginal cost; in case 2, we assume that licensee's marginal cost after
licensing is less than or equals licensor's marginal cost. In case 1, we obtain that the pooling strategy and licensing one-type licensee equilibrium coexists, and the optimal contract offered by patentee is always with pure royalty. In case 2, we obtain that, all the pooling, separating and licensing one-type licensee equilibrium can exist, and licensor will only choice the two-part tariff licensing in the separating equilibrium. This result also shows that the licensor can offer menus of contract to separate the real type of licensee to get much licensing revenue under symmetric information if the marginal cost of licensee after licensing is relatively low.
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