A Study of CEO Pay Slice: The Case of Taiwanese Firms

• Main Authors: HUANG, CHUN-HAO, 黃純皜
• Other Authors: WANG, CHIEN HO
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83948737050181913853

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 101 === The study investigates the correlation of CEO pay slice (CPS) and Tobin’s q in Taiwan listed companies. After the Securities and Futures Bureau of Taiwan amended the new law in 2006, all of the publicly traded companies in Taiwan changed their disclosure standards to level distance, which reduced the transparency of compensation information in the top management. Empirical results show that Tobin’s q and ROA are not significantly prevalent in the level of CPS. CPS level is most affected by some variables that involve executive power, such as numbers of VPs or CEO Is Only Director. On the other hand, after the author adjusts the endogenous of CPS, the empirical results also displays that CPS does not significantly influence Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is highly influenced by some company feature variables, such as “Insider Ownership”, “R&D” and “Leverage”. Moreover, the cross variable regressions show that, if the proportion of part-time directors is higher, Tobin’s q would be at lower level. Similarly, CPS does not impact ROA significantly. ROA is strongly affected by “Log TA”, “R&D”, “Leverage” and “Abnormal Total Compensation”. These findings demonstrate that we need to promote the compensation transparency and distinguish the authority between executives and directors, which can efficiently improve corporate governance.