An analytical study the relationship between incentive contract and information disclosure decision

• Main Authors: Liu, Wen-Chang, 劉文程
• Other Authors: CHIU, SHIN-TSUN
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67524894617158237822

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 101 === This research uses a game-theoretical model to study the effects of compensation contract on the disclosing incentive of managers. The compensation contracts consider here can be classified two dimensions : the single period or mult-period and fixed wages and variable wages contracts. After observing the contract offered by company, the manager will select the disclosure decision to max his utility On the company's side, it will select the contract to achieve the largest profit, according to the manager responds. The results show that the single period : the fixed wages contract does not provide the incentive to the manager to disclose, while the variable contract with the large bonus does. On the other hand, all kinds of mult-period contracts provide incentive contract with different costs. the company should consider all benefit and cost in the selection of compensation contract .