Relationship among Earning Management, Ownership Structure and Meeting Analysts Forecasts: Evidence from China
碩士 === 國立臺灣師範大學 === 管理研究所 === 101 === Abstract This study aims to investigate the relation between Chinese listed firms manipulating earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earning forecasts and shareholding structure. This study also examinewhether nonstate-owned businesses is more likely to manipulate...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
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2013
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82958804890788708090 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣師範大學 === 管理研究所 === 101 === Abstract
This study aims to investigate the relation between Chinese listed firms manipulating earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earning forecasts and shareholding structure. This study also examinewhether nonstate-owned businesses is more likely to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts than state-owned enterprises. We investigate whether firms owned by local government is more likely to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earning forecasts than firms owned by central government. Furthermore, this study investigates whether CEO political connections and the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors are associated with the likelihood for firms to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.
The empirical results reveal that there is no significant difference in the likelihood of manipulating earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts between non state-owned businesses and state-owned enterprises. We find that firms owned by local government are more likely to overproduce or reduce selling, general and administrative expenses to meet or beat analysts’ earning forecasts than firms owned by central government. Moreover, there is no significant relationship between CEO political connections and the likelihood for firms to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. There is no significant relationship between the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors and the likelihood for firms to manipulate earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.
Keywords: Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts; Discretionary accruls; Real transaction manipulation
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