| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立清華大學 === 哲學研究所 === 101 === Traditional epistemologist supposes that the factors, which make a true belief to satisfy the condition of knowledge, are truth-conducive (ex. evidence). Truth-conducive factors are within the area of theoretical rationality, but they have no relation to practice. Stanley regards this kind of traditional epistemological view, i.e. the condition of knowledge does not depend upon practical facts, as “intellectualism”. In Knowledge and Practical Interests, he wants to modify this view of intellectualism. Stanley noticed that contextualists have showed some examples that suggest the condition of knowledge depends not only on truth-conducive factors but also on practical factors. Stanley points out that these examples raised by contextualists can already provide an argument against intellectualism. Nevertheless the thesis of contextualists is for Stanley not plausible enough. Therefore, Stanley claims an intellectualian interpretation – Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) – to make these examples plausible. IRI supposes that someone’s knowing of a statement is possibly partly determined by the practical facts of the subject's environment.
In my essay, I will examine the argument, which is raised by Stanley and regarded as anti-intellectualism, and see if Stanley has made it successfully. In view of anti-contextualism, Stanley's criticism is so strong that many of the contextualists are urgent to defend for their theses. With regard to IRI, Stanley also has to face with the weakness of his own arguments, which is strongly questioned by epistemologists. Finally, I conclude that Stanley doesn't succeed to defense his argument of anti-intellectualism.
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