The Economic Analysis of Collusion -- An Evidence of Taiwan Gasoline Industry

• Main Authors: Chung-Hsuan Wang, 王仲萱
• Other Authors: Hwei-an Tsai
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/v5kqbx

碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 101 === The main idea of this thesis is to explore and explain how to prove there is an agreement between cartel members by economic evidence. We use an econometric model which based on cartel member’s incentive compatibility constraints to analysis the case. In order to build a general cartel model, we introduce the probability of detection function and information index. Furthermore, we choose a cartel case and analysis whether there is an agreement between cartel members. The stability of the cartel will be affected when variables change. We test whether the variables have the following three relationships in four periods: (1) a positive relationship between current margin and the demand exception (2) a positive relationship between current margin and the cost exception (3) a negative relationship between current margin and the exception change of margin. We get the following conclusions: some periods show their behaviors consist with theoretical model but some periods don’t, we believe that is affected by Taiwan gasoline market’s feature. We believe that cartel cases analyzed by appropriate theoretical models, empirical analysis, along with other plus factors would make judgment much fairer and better.