Using the coalition game theory to analyze the stability of CCSBT
碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 101 === Regional fishery management organizations encourage nation states to enter in regulatory agreements in order to avoid depleting the available resource stock. However in the case the organizations employ total allowable catch policy, non-cooperating countries do n...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2013
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57394570577882499032 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 101 === Regional fishery management organizations encourage nation states to enter in regulatory agreements in order to avoid depleting the available resource stock. However in the case the organizations employ total allowable catch policy, non-cooperating countries do not suffer restrictions and can thus increase their catch. This can be viewed as a positive externality at the cost of faster stock deterioration. In the case the benefits from non-cooperation exceed the benefit of avoiding stock exhaustion a country will have incentives not to sign in to the organization.
This paper uses a two stages coalition game approach to analyze the stability of such organizations. In the first stage it is assumed that all nations cooperate in the policy. In the second the inquiry will consider how participation evolves as this becomes dependent on each nation’s profit function.
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