A Study on the Legitimacy of Paternalism Relating to Children’s Religious Rights

• Main Authors: Huang, YuChih, 黃聿芝
• Other Authors: 莊勝義
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/12053681633886419553

博士 === 國立高雄師範大學 === 教育學系 === 101 === This study is focused on the legitimacy of paternalism relating to children’s religious rights. In order to do so, the concepts of rights and paternalism are analyzed and interpreted on the basis of rights theories deriving from Wesley N. Hohfeld, Isaiah Berlin, H. L. A. Hart, Hillel Steiner, Colin A. Wringe, Joel Feinberg and Ronald Dworkin. In doing so the skill of “foundational research” is employed to brief the topics firstly, then to describe in detail the cases in connection with concepts relevant to the topics, and finally to explain clearly the conclusions. As regards the cases, with the intention of relating to religious issues, Wisconsin v. Yoder, Mozert v. Hawkins, and Zion in Taiwan are adopted. Paternalism is normally understood as the interference in the liberty of action of a person on the grounds of benefiting that person. It is justifiable from direct consideration of children’s own welfare. As regards children’s religious rights, if exercising the rights to choose different religion will make a seriously and irrevocable harm to these children, then providing protection for them to secure their immediate advantages becomes necessary. Otherwise, in order to maximize children’s rights of autonomy, the obligation of non-interference against their choices of faith turn to be the trump. The right of autonomy is, however, more than merely non-interference. It is the right to the protection and promotion of one’s ability to lead to a self-governed life. This conception of rights is a life’s being led, which connotes both the ability to take responsibility and to have a sense of it. Based on the above analyses and arguments, the main conclusions are as follows: first, children’s rights must be capacity-based, poor capacity will cause disastrous errors. Second, in order to teach children to make choices by themselves, parents must be confined to the boundary of fiduciary obligation to fulfill their obligation of non-interference. Third, the respect for children’s religious choices and their right of autonomy would promote the ranges of choice for them to grasp greater control of lives. Finally, children’s religious rights should be regarded as parents’ negative obligation and school’s positive obligation. The former means someone has a freedom to do what s/he wants without interference by other persons; the latter means an individual’s wish to be her/his own master that s/he can make decisions by her/himself. The suggestion of this study is proposed that children’s religious rights have to be taken seriously with the justifiable paternalism held in families or schools to protect their right of autonomy and to enhance their values of lives.