The Effect of Directors’ and Supervisors’ Remuneration and Liability Insurance on Cost of Debt

• Main Author: 李怡璇
• Other Authors: 陳瑞斌
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82972050633335578853

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 會計學系 === 101 === The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between directors' remuneration, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and corporate's cost of debt. This research chooses the listed companies which contain 2100 observations from 2008 to 2012. The results are summarized as the following: 1. It is significantly negative association between directors' remuneration and cost of debt, which means that because of incentives maintain high remuneration, the directors and supervisors may hardly monitor management for shareholders, and diminish the corporate's cost of debt. 2. It is significantly negative association between Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and cost of debt, which means that Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance can reinforce the monitoring ability of directors, reducing the corporate's cost of debt. 3. Firms with greater corporate performance have higher directors' remuneration, reducing the corporate's cost of debt. 4. Firms with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder, increasing the corporate's cost of debt. 5. Firms with increased coverage have lower the corporate's cost of debt.