A study on the influence of incentive mechanisms on the work performance of financial consultants in state-owned banks-An example of a state-owned bank

• Main Authors: Yi-ShanLin, 林怡珊
• Other Authors: Yu-Lin Wang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/285bbm

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 經營管理碩士學位學程(AMBA) === 101 === State-owned banks are government institutions forced to become competitive in response to competitors in the market in order to make a profit for the government. Ever since wealth management services were first provided, financial consultants in state-owned banks have been in a predicament. Financial consultants in state-owned banks are not as enthusiastic as those in private banks because they do not have bonuses, work in a high pressure environment, and work long hours. This has also resulted in high turnover and poor work performance. Research problems of this study include: (1)Whether if the current incentive system is effective. (2)Work performance evaluations. (3)The influence of the incentive system on work performance. Subjects of this study are financial consultants in state-owned banks. This study mainly explores the effects of various incentive systems on their work performance, including promotion, commendation, training, work rotation, reward and punishment system, and retirement conditions. Research results are as follows: (I)Financial consultants in state-owned banks showed approval towards the following incentive systems: “living and work related benefits,” “salary and bonus,” and “commendation and personal growth.” However, they generally held negative opinions regarding the fairness, controllability, accessibility, and communication of the incentive mechanisms. (II)Regardless of “gender,” “age,” “education degree” and “seniority,” financial consultants in state-owned banks attached greater importance to “Promotion system”、 “Performance Bonus” in “work performance.”