| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 應用經濟學系所 === 101 === With China and Japan increased demand for energy, the disputes between China and Japan for crude oil and natural gas in the East China Sea occur frequently. There are also unresolved national sovereignty and strategies and other sensitive issues, in addition to the dispute for energy. In this regard, there have been many studies to analyze the legal aspects of the East China Sea dispute, and tried to put forward suggestions or solutions. However, there are very few studies to use game theory with real data to analyze the possible equilibrium outcome of the game between China and Japan.
In this study, I collected military costs, trade and tourism and other related information of China and Japan, I establish a 2x2 non-cooperative simultaneous-move game model. Each player has two strategies which are "tough" and "compromise" in this model. I assume as one country adopts tough strategy and another adopt compromise strategy, then the country which adopt the tough strategy will get all resource of the East China Sea.
The results showed that the optimal solution is to adopt the opposite strategy against to the opponent. It is not easy for both China and Japan to adopt a "concession" strategy. Through the correlated equilibrium concept in the game theory, it is possible to promote these two countries to negotiate. Once the agreement was established, there is no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies for any players. Although both sides may disagree with the winning probabilities, they can negotiate. Eventually this concept may assist China and Japan to reach an agreement, so their relationship and regional stability improved significantly.
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