The effect of mandatory auditor assignment on audit quality and audit fees in China

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計研究所 === 101 === This paper examines the effect of regulations on audit quality and audit fees in China. China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued some rules in 2004 to improve audit quality for state-owned enterprises...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: 鄭勝通
Other Authors: 戚務君
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/53821359259736315579
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計研究所 === 101 === This paper examines the effect of regulations on audit quality and audit fees in China. China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued some rules in 2004 to improve audit quality for state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government (CSOEs), such as SASAC Order No. 5 and SASAC Rule No. 173. Under these rules, SASAC mandatorily assign auditors for CSOEs, and CSOEs’ managers have to retain auditors for at least 2 years and at most 5 years. This paper investigates listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2009, and uses abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality and a difference-in-differences design to examine the effect of these rules on audit quality and audit fees. The empirical results suggest that after the enactment of these rules, the audit quality for CSOEs relative to other companies improves and the audit fees for CSOEs relative to other companies reduce.