| Summary: | 碩士 === 崑山科技大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 101 === This study uses 30 private equity placements in Taiwan financial institutions as samples during 2003 to 2011, which include 18 common stock and 12 preferred stock. The empirical results find that premium of private equity placements in Taiwan financial institutions are more than discount. The average discount/ premium is 24.62% on 10 days after stockholders resolution meeting, the average discount/ premium is 24.90% on one days before stockholders resolution meeting, The average discount/ premium is 34.48% on private placement complete day.
One of the purposes of this study is to test the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms-the degree of deviation of voting right and cash flow right, the shareholdings of directors and supervisors, the pledging ratio of directors and supervisors, the shareholdings of foreign institutions, the shareholdings of managers on discount of private equity placement. The second purpose of this study is to test whether there exists self-interested behavior for insider investment? On the other hand, the discount of insider investing is significantly less than outsider investing. The third purpose of this study is to test whether there are significantly negative impact on discount of private placement of different insider –directors and supervisors, managers, blockholders and relationship investors? The fourth purpose of this study is to test whether there exists significantly negative impact on discount of private placement of different outsider- aggressive investors, strategic investors and passive investors ?
The empirical results show that the deviation of voting right and cash flow right,the shareholding of directors and supervisors have significantly negative impact on discount/premium of private equity placement. Other corporate governance mechanism variables- pledging ratio of directors and supervisors, proportion shareholding of foreign institution, shareholdings of managers are all have insignificantly positive impact on premium of private placement. The amount of private placement has insignificantly positive impact on discount/premium of private equity placement. The firm size has insignificantly negative impact on discount/premium of private equity placement. The insider investing has insignificantly positive impact on premium of private equity placement. The outsider investing has insignificantly negative impact on premium of private placement. The impact of insider (managers or blockholders) investing on premium of private placement is insignificantly negative, while the impact of insider(directors and supervisors, or relationship investors) investing on premium of private placement is insignificantly positive. Aggressive investors and strategic investors have insignificantly negative impact on discount/premium of private placement, while passive investors have significantly negative impact on discount/premium of private placement.
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