Efforts and Asymmetric Information: Evidence from MLB Players’ Performance
碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 財務金融系碩士班 === 101 === In this paper we study whether the MLB players induce the problem of asymmetric information, including the adverse selection and the moral hazard. We use long term contracts, greater or equal to three years contract, signed by the Major League Baseball (MLB) pl...
Main Authors: | Po-Hsin Hsu, 許柏信 |
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Other Authors: | Young-Lang Chang |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2013
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19462322374959317653 |
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