CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups

碩士 === 清雲科技大學 === 國際企業管理研究所 === 101 === In this study, the survey sample consisted of Group 53 and Non-Group 43 from the Credit Risk companies in 2000-2011. Using statistical methods to construct Group professional credit risk models, considering the agency problems generated by the management and o...

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Main Authors: Mei-Lan Tseng, 曾美蘭
Other Authors: Hui-Fun Yu
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2012
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25073360054124795774
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spelling ndltd-TW-1013210312017-04-29T04:31:10Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25073360054124795774 CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups 集團業專業經營、公司治理與信用風險模型之實證研究 Mei-Lan Tseng 曾美蘭 碩士 清雲科技大學 國際企業管理研究所 101 In this study, the survey sample consisted of Group 53 and Non-Group 43 from the Credit Risk companies in 2000-2011. Using statistical methods to construct Group professional credit risk models, considering the agency problems generated by the management and ownership operated separately, to find the CEO Power of Chief Executive Officer, CEO significantly affect the variables of company''s performance. Expectations of investors, financial institutions and stakeholders to predict the probability of financial risks may occur, reducing the possibility of financial risk loss, thus increasing corporate value. For empirical analysis, K-S test, M-U test and Logistic credit risk models were established.The empirical results suggest that, when the management and ownership separated, the CEO power for Group would influence the corporate performance on financial structure, solvency, management ability, profitability, cash flow and the indicators of corporate governance; as soon as possible to improve the ratio of interest coverage and cash flow adequacy can enhance debt service and management capacity, reduce the possibility of financial risk; reduce the rates of interest expense and improve the ratio of cash flow to face the problem of the funding gap in the short term; The Professional managers (CEO) avoid the replacement of the accountant and set up the directors and supervisors independently, enhancing the ability of corporate governance, improving corporate performance. The main impact on the performance of non-group companies are financial structure, solvency, management ability, profitability and the indicators of cash flow. The Non-Group companies adjust the policy of dividend, reducing the ratio of cash reinvestment, earnings per share (EPS), the ratio of internal reserves, reducing the occurrence probability of credit risk; increasing inventory turnover, fixed asset turnover, operating profit margin and the ratio of cash flow adequacy can enhance the company''s profitability. Therefore, the empirical value and managerial implications of this study, the CEO Power of Group''s companies avoids the replacement of the accountant and sets up the directors and supervisors independently can improve corporate governance, and reduce the possibility of credit risk. Hui-Fun Yu 余惠芳 2012 學位論文 ; thesis 69 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 清雲科技大學 === 國際企業管理研究所 === 101 === In this study, the survey sample consisted of Group 53 and Non-Group 43 from the Credit Risk companies in 2000-2011. Using statistical methods to construct Group professional credit risk models, considering the agency problems generated by the management and ownership operated separately, to find the CEO Power of Chief Executive Officer, CEO significantly affect the variables of company''s performance. Expectations of investors, financial institutions and stakeholders to predict the probability of financial risks may occur, reducing the possibility of financial risk loss, thus increasing corporate value. For empirical analysis, K-S test, M-U test and Logistic credit risk models were established.The empirical results suggest that, when the management and ownership separated, the CEO power for Group would influence the corporate performance on financial structure, solvency, management ability, profitability, cash flow and the indicators of corporate governance; as soon as possible to improve the ratio of interest coverage and cash flow adequacy can enhance debt service and management capacity, reduce the possibility of financial risk; reduce the rates of interest expense and improve the ratio of cash flow to face the problem of the funding gap in the short term; The Professional managers (CEO) avoid the replacement of the accountant and set up the directors and supervisors independently, enhancing the ability of corporate governance, improving corporate performance. The main impact on the performance of non-group companies are financial structure, solvency, management ability, profitability and the indicators of cash flow. The Non-Group companies adjust the policy of dividend, reducing the ratio of cash reinvestment, earnings per share (EPS), the ratio of internal reserves, reducing the occurrence probability of credit risk; increasing inventory turnover, fixed asset turnover, operating profit margin and the ratio of cash flow adequacy can enhance the company''s profitability. Therefore, the empirical value and managerial implications of this study, the CEO Power of Group''s companies avoids the replacement of the accountant and sets up the directors and supervisors independently can improve corporate governance, and reduce the possibility of credit risk.
author2 Hui-Fun Yu
author_facet Hui-Fun Yu
Mei-Lan Tseng
曾美蘭
author Mei-Lan Tseng
曾美蘭
spellingShingle Mei-Lan Tseng
曾美蘭
CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups
author_sort Mei-Lan Tseng
title CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups
title_short CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups
title_full CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups
title_fullStr CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups
title_full_unstemmed CEO Power, Corporate Governance and Credit Risk Models:Evidence on Cross-Holding Groups
title_sort ceo power, corporate governance and credit risk models:evidence on cross-holding groups
publishDate 2012
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25073360054124795774
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