Profit Sharing Models for Newsvendor Problem Considering Market Demand and Product Quality Risk

• Main Authors: Pei-Ting Liao, 廖姵婷
• Other Authors: 徐旭昇
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/22431332552189702508

碩士 === 元智大學 === 工業工程與管理學系 === 100 === This research studies channel coordination through profit sharing contracts for a newsvendor supply chain model that considers both market demand uncertainty and product quality risk. We investigate two distinct types of arrangements between a retailer and his supplier. One arrangement is a wholesale-price driven contract and the other is a sales-agent contract. It is assumed that both parties share the same information on market demand distribution, salvage value per unsold unit, shortage cost per unit, and product cost per unit. Furthermore, it is assumed that the market demand is Weibull distributed, and the market price will influence the scale and shape parameters of the distribution. The first arrangement is a game-theoretic model, where the supplier offers a wholesale price to the retailer, and the retailer will then determine the market price and order quantity based on maximizing his own profit. On the other hand, the supplier will bear the product quality cost, and his profit will be the total sales revenue deducted by the production cost and product quality cost. In this arrangement, the supplier will select the wholesale price that maximizes his profit, and the retailer will determine the market price and the order quantity that optimize his profit with the given wholesale price. In the second arrangement, the supplier manages the supply chain business decisions, which include the market price, production quantity, and product inspection sampling plan. The objective is to maximize the total profit of the supply chain. The retailer serves as a sales agent, and will receive the commission amounting to at least what he should earn in the first arrangement. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the two arrangements, as well as a discussion of how to negotiate win-win conditions. Finally, sensitivity analyses of the problem parameters are provided.