Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings
碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 會計系研究所 === 100 === Prior studies suggest that there are two coexistent yet unlike to be mutually exclusive motives for managers’ real activities manipulation reporting: opportunistic earnings reporting hypothesis versus informative size-adjusting hypothesis. The former hypothesis...
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ndltd-TW-100YUNT53850022015-10-13T21:55:44Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87494492614159303122 Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings 實質盈餘管理與會計資訊價值攸關性之關係---機構投資者中介角色之檢測 Yi-Fang Chou 周儀芳 碩士 國立雲林科技大學 會計系研究所 100 Prior studies suggest that there are two coexistent yet unlike to be mutually exclusive motives for managers’ real activities manipulation reporting: opportunistic earnings reporting hypothesis versus informative size-adjusting hypothesis. The former hypothesis suggests that strategic real activities manipulation deteriorates the earnings informativeness, then, decreases the value-relevance of earnings. Yet, the latter hypothesis argues that firms may seek to signal their future operating performance by way of real activities adjustment then increases the value-relevance of earnings. Thus, the association between real activities manipulation and earnings quality is called for further examination. Moreover, this study conjectures that the monitoring role of institutional investor can enhance the informative components of managerial real activities manipulation, in turn, improve the informativeness of accounting numbers. This study uses institutional investor’s ownership as an intermediary variable to proxy the informative components of real activities manipulating, then, examines the effect of real activities manipulation on the value-relevance of accounting numbers. The empirical results support the opportunistism earnings reporting hypothesis that the real activities manipulation is negatively (positively) associated with the value relevance of earnings (equity book value). Incorporating the role of institutional investors into consideration, it is found that the real activities manipulation accompanies with higher institutional investor’s ownership, the more value-relevance increases of earnings and equity book value. This study demonstrates some diagnostic checks and evidences the results are robust to the various specifications. Ching-Lung Chen 陳慶隆 2012 學位論文 ; thesis 64 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 會計系研究所 === 100 === Prior studies suggest that there are two coexistent yet unlike to be mutually exclusive motives for managers’ real activities manipulation reporting: opportunistic earnings reporting hypothesis versus informative size-adjusting hypothesis. The former hypothesis suggests that strategic real activities manipulation deteriorates the earnings informativeness, then, decreases the value-relevance of earnings. Yet, the latter hypothesis argues that firms may seek to signal their future operating performance by way of real activities adjustment then increases the value-relevance of earnings. Thus, the association between real activities manipulation and earnings quality is called for further examination. Moreover, this study conjectures that the monitoring role of institutional investor can enhance the informative components of managerial real activities manipulation, in turn, improve the informativeness of accounting numbers. This study uses institutional investor’s ownership as an intermediary variable to proxy the informative components of real activities manipulating, then, examines the effect of real activities manipulation on the value-relevance of accounting numbers. The empirical results support the opportunistism earnings reporting hypothesis that the real activities manipulation is negatively (positively) associated with the value relevance of earnings (equity book value). Incorporating the role of institutional investors into consideration, it is found that the real activities manipulation accompanies with higher institutional investor’s ownership, the more value-relevance increases of earnings and equity book value. This study demonstrates some diagnostic checks and evidences the results are robust to the various specifications.
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author2 |
Ching-Lung Chen |
author_facet |
Ching-Lung Chen Yi-Fang Chou 周儀芳 |
author |
Yi-Fang Chou 周儀芳 |
spellingShingle |
Yi-Fang Chou 周儀芳 Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings |
author_sort |
Yi-Fang Chou |
title |
Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings |
title_short |
Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings |
title_full |
Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings |
title_fullStr |
Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings |
title_full_unstemmed |
Real Activities Manipulation and the Value-relevance of Accounting Numbers---The Moderating Role of Institutional Shareholdings |
title_sort |
real activities manipulation and the value-relevance of accounting numbers---the moderating role of institutional shareholdings |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87494492614159303122 |
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