The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of ex...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2012
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61025967826188801573 |
id |
ndltd-TW-100TKU05335005 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-TW-100TKU053350052015-10-13T21:27:33Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61025967826188801573 The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market 雙占市場下獨家交易契約的效果 Yi-Chieh Lee 李依潔 碩士 淡江大學 產業經濟學系碩士班 100 Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of exclusive dealing contract on the other upstream firm’s choice of exclusion as well as its profit. We find that if the upstream rival does not imply any kind of exclusive dealing contract, either upward exclusive dealing or downward exclusive dealing, the other upstream firm will choose downward exclusive dealing contract. If the upstream rival uses upward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm is indifferent from having exclusive dealing contract or not. But if the upstream rival firm has downward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm’s choice will depend on the production cost of two downstream firms. Yi-Heng Chen 陳宜亨 2012 學位論文 ; thesis 54 zh-TW |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
zh-TW |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of exclusive dealing contract on the other upstream firm’s choice of exclusion as well as its profit.
We find that if the upstream rival does not imply any kind of exclusive dealing contract, either upward exclusive dealing or downward exclusive dealing, the other upstream firm will choose downward exclusive dealing contract. If the upstream rival uses upward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm is indifferent from having exclusive dealing contract or not. But if the upstream rival firm has downward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm’s choice will depend on the production cost of two downstream firms.
|
author2 |
Yi-Heng Chen |
author_facet |
Yi-Heng Chen Yi-Chieh Lee 李依潔 |
author |
Yi-Chieh Lee 李依潔 |
spellingShingle |
Yi-Chieh Lee 李依潔 The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market |
author_sort |
Yi-Chieh Lee |
title |
The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market |
title_short |
The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market |
title_full |
The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market |
title_fullStr |
The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market |
title_full_unstemmed |
The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market |
title_sort |
effect of exclusive dealing contracts in successive duopoly market |
publishDate |
2012 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61025967826188801573 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT yichiehlee theeffectofexclusivedealingcontractsinsuccessiveduopolymarket AT lǐyījié theeffectofexclusivedealingcontractsinsuccessiveduopolymarket AT yichiehlee shuāngzhànshìchǎngxiàdújiājiāoyìqìyuēdexiàoguǒ AT lǐyījié shuāngzhànshìchǎngxiàdújiājiāoyìqìyuēdexiàoguǒ AT yichiehlee effectofexclusivedealingcontractsinsuccessiveduopolymarket AT lǐyījié effectofexclusivedealingcontractsinsuccessiveduopolymarket |
_version_ |
1718063644832432128 |