The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of ex...

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Main Authors: Yi-Chieh Lee, 李依潔
Other Authors: Yi-Heng Chen
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2012
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61025967826188801573
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spelling ndltd-TW-100TKU053350052015-10-13T21:27:33Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61025967826188801573 The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market 雙占市場下獨家交易契約的效果 Yi-Chieh Lee 李依潔 碩士 淡江大學 產業經濟學系碩士班 100 Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of exclusive dealing contract on the other upstream firm’s choice of exclusion as well as its profit. We find that if the upstream rival does not imply any kind of exclusive dealing contract, either upward exclusive dealing or downward exclusive dealing, the other upstream firm will choose downward exclusive dealing contract. If the upstream rival uses upward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm is indifferent from having exclusive dealing contract or not. But if the upstream rival firm has downward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm’s choice will depend on the production cost of two downstream firms. Yi-Heng Chen 陳宜亨 2012 學位論文 ; thesis 54 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === Based on the market structure in Chang(1992)and the derived demand from Cournot competition as in Salinger(1988), this paper set up a market structure with two upstream firms and two downstream firms to investigate the effect of upstream rival’s choice of exclusive dealing contract on the other upstream firm’s choice of exclusion as well as its profit. We find that if the upstream rival does not imply any kind of exclusive dealing contract, either upward exclusive dealing or downward exclusive dealing, the other upstream firm will choose downward exclusive dealing contract. If the upstream rival uses upward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm is indifferent from having exclusive dealing contract or not. But if the upstream rival firm has downward exclusive dealing contract, the other upstream firm’s choice will depend on the production cost of two downstream firms.
author2 Yi-Heng Chen
author_facet Yi-Heng Chen
Yi-Chieh Lee
李依潔
author Yi-Chieh Lee
李依潔
spellingShingle Yi-Chieh Lee
李依潔
The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
author_sort Yi-Chieh Lee
title The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
title_short The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
title_full The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
title_fullStr The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
title_full_unstemmed The effect of Exclusive Dealing Contracts in Successive Duopoly market
title_sort effect of exclusive dealing contracts in successive duopoly market
publishDate 2012
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61025967826188801573
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