| Summary: | 碩士 === 世新大學 === 財務金融學研究所(含碩專班) === 100 === From the current rapidly changing financial market, it is not difficult to find in the self-interest incentives, the executive is likely for their own interests and ignore the shareholders' equity, ignored in pursuit of the goal of maximizing the value of the company, in turn derived from the agency problem. This study aims to explore the listing and OTC financial holding group's corporate governance, financial performance and effect between executive compensation Corporate governance, financial performance and other variables to examine its influence on the compensation of executives. Fourteen financial holding groups in this study, 2001-2010 cabinet on sale in Taiwan as research subjects, 129 documents using descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation coefficient and multiple regression analysis and other methods to verify that each variable's relationship. Important conclusions of this study are as follows:
(1) The higher financial performance he operates, the higher pay the executive gains.
(2) The larger the size of the board is, the higher pay the executive gains.
(3) The higher percentage large shareholders hold share, the lower pay executive gains.
(4) The higher percentage institutional investors hold, the lower pay executive gains.
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