Multi-Output firm under Vertical Differentiation

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 經濟學系 === 100 ===   This research primary discussion the topics focus on after attend the new market element into the original duopoly vertical differentiation model, then formal the vertical differentiation model coexisted in the oligopoly and monopoly two kind structures, we discuss...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yaw-Wen Liu, 劉耀文
Other Authors: Tsai, Jyh-Fa
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2012
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97590029663677833558
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Summary:碩士 === 東吳大學 === 經濟學系 === 100 ===   This research primary discussion the topics focus on after attend the new market element into the original duopoly vertical differentiation model, then formal the vertical differentiation model coexisted in the oligopoly and monopoly two kind structures, we discuss under the assumption of without the uncovered market and government regulate the monopoly firm pricing, the analysis process about the behavior of the firm including and excluding quality cost how to find these two firms optimal price and quality.   The research keep going to two stage uncooperative sequence game theory: in the first stage these two firms simultaneous decide their optimal quality solution under the profit maximization; in the second stage, these two firms simultaneous decide their optimal price solution under the profit maximization.   About research model behavior it can be explained to two parts, First, it contains without quality cost and the same consumer ceiling between two markets, this paper finds the standard quality tendency of the low quality firm is the 8/11 times of the high quality firm, the second is when added the quality cost and the differential consumption ceiling between two markets, when we simulate these figures to the model, we get several conclusions. When fixed to monopoly market parameters of consumer distribution ceiling for product preference, and to rising duopoly market parameters of consumer distribution ceiling for product preference, it will cause the quality of the two firms increased, the equilibrium price of the two firms increased, it raising two firms quality differentiation. For the other way, when fixed to duopoly market parameters of consumer distribution ceiling for product preference, and to change monopoly market parameters of consumer distribution ceiling for product preference, also have the same conclusion. In addition, we find the larger the coefficient of the quality cost, it will let firm equilibrium quality and price become smaller, and the quality differentiation also becomes smaller too.