| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 應用經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === In recent years, the mergers and acquisitions have become the focal issue in the presence of internationalization and liberalization. The rise of merger wave has led many economists to concern about merger issues. It should be noted that the merger on the corporate overall strategy should be taken as a mean and it is not the final target.
In the first chapter, we consider a mixed oligopoly market in which there are three types of firms in the industry. We postulate that firms have increasing marginal cost and each firm produces the good using identical technology. Under pre-merger, due to that private firm is more cost efficient than the public firm, we first find that the profit of public firm is lower than the profit of another private firm. We next analyze the decision made by the public and both private firms on possible merge in the first stage of the game. The post-merger social welfare is large than the pre-merger social welfare when the public firm decides to merger with another private firm. Since the gap of social welfare decreases, it enhances the public firm’s incentive to merge. In addition, we find that the merger between the private firms, the social welfare after merger is lower than the social welfare before merger.
In the third chapter, there are three scenarios in endogenous timing framework of Stackelberg after the merger, which are (a) public firm and a private firm without foreign penetration, (b) merger involving public firm and a private firm without foreign penetration, and (c) merger involving no public firm. We find that on each case it has an optimal Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
Keywords: Horizontal merger, Endogenous Timing, Foreign Penetration, Mixed oligopoly
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