Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location

碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 應用經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === In recent years, developing countries endeavor to protect the environment and improve social welfare. This thesis mainly focus on the environment policy under imperfect competition. It explores how will privatization, government's preference of tax, a...

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Main Authors: Wen-hong Wang, 王文宏
Other Authors: Leonard F.S. Wang
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2012
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24975688218460571725
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spelling ndltd-TW-100NUK054120042016-07-15T04:17:15Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24975688218460571725 Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location 不完全競爭市場下環境議題之研究:工會,租稅與區位選擇 Wen-hong Wang 王文宏 碩士 國立高雄大學 應用經濟學系碩士班 100 In recent years, developing countries endeavor to protect the environment and improve social welfare. This thesis mainly focus on the environment policy under imperfect competition. It explores how will privatization, government's preference of tax, and environmental policy respectively affect domestic output, profit, social welfare, environment and location. In chapter 2, when both emission and profit tax are imposed on the firms with productivity differentials and union, we find that (i) Under centralized union, lower profit tax will lead to a lower emission taxes and the output will be higher.; (ii) When emission and profit tax are imposed, the social welfare under centralized wage will belower than the one under decentralized wages, while the environmental damage and firm’s profit under centralized wage will be higher than the one under decentralized wages. In chapter 3, the government’s tax preference is incorporated into unionized mixed oligopoly, we find that (i) In unionized mixed oligopoly with production-caused emission, social welfare increases with an increase in government’s preference for tax revenues.; However, (ii) In unionized private oligopoly with production-caused pollution, social welfare increases with a decrease on government preference for tax revenues; (iii) When the government’s preference and pollution rate are higher, pollution tax under unionized mixed oligopoly is higher than the one under unionized privatize oligopoly. In chapter 4 on the issue of plant location with distance-related pollution tax, we find that (i) The output level of the firm is higher as a result of a higher pollution tax, if the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.; (ii) The plant location of the firm is further away from the CBD as a result of a higher pollution tax, which isirrespective of the type of return to scale.; (iii) When the government protects the resident and implements pollution taxes, it will increase the utility of residents.(iv), regardless of the type of return to scale. A higher pollution tax will definitely decrease the pollution to the CBD regardless of the type of return to scale. Leonard F.S. Wang 王鳳生 2012 學位論文 ; thesis 47 en_US
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description 碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 應用經濟學系碩士班 === 100 === In recent years, developing countries endeavor to protect the environment and improve social welfare. This thesis mainly focus on the environment policy under imperfect competition. It explores how will privatization, government's preference of tax, and environmental policy respectively affect domestic output, profit, social welfare, environment and location. In chapter 2, when both emission and profit tax are imposed on the firms with productivity differentials and union, we find that (i) Under centralized union, lower profit tax will lead to a lower emission taxes and the output will be higher.; (ii) When emission and profit tax are imposed, the social welfare under centralized wage will belower than the one under decentralized wages, while the environmental damage and firm’s profit under centralized wage will be higher than the one under decentralized wages. In chapter 3, the government’s tax preference is incorporated into unionized mixed oligopoly, we find that (i) In unionized mixed oligopoly with production-caused emission, social welfare increases with an increase in government’s preference for tax revenues.; However, (ii) In unionized private oligopoly with production-caused pollution, social welfare increases with a decrease on government preference for tax revenues; (iii) When the government’s preference and pollution rate are higher, pollution tax under unionized mixed oligopoly is higher than the one under unionized privatize oligopoly. In chapter 4 on the issue of plant location with distance-related pollution tax, we find that (i) The output level of the firm is higher as a result of a higher pollution tax, if the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.; (ii) The plant location of the firm is further away from the CBD as a result of a higher pollution tax, which isirrespective of the type of return to scale.; (iii) When the government protects the resident and implements pollution taxes, it will increase the utility of residents.(iv), regardless of the type of return to scale. A higher pollution tax will definitely decrease the pollution to the CBD regardless of the type of return to scale.
author2 Leonard F.S. Wang
author_facet Leonard F.S. Wang
Wen-hong Wang
王文宏
author Wen-hong Wang
王文宏
spellingShingle Wen-hong Wang
王文宏
Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
author_sort Wen-hong Wang
title Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
title_short Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
title_full Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
title_fullStr Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
title_full_unstemmed Essays on the Environment under Imperfect Competition:Unionization, Taxation and Plant Location
title_sort essays on the environment under imperfect competition:unionization, taxation and plant location
publishDate 2012
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24975688218460571725
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