Auditor Industry Specialization and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Executive Compensation

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 100 === This study examines whether firms have higher pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation when audited by an industry specialist. Using a sample of publicly-traded Taiwanese companies during 2005-2010, this study finds that there is a significantly posi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yuen-Ting Lee, 李婉婷
Other Authors: Chin-Hsien Liao
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2012
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71620818135979916427
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 100 === This study examines whether firms have higher pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation when audited by an industry specialist. Using a sample of publicly-traded Taiwanese companies during 2005-2010, this study finds that there is a significantly positive association between auditor industry specialization and pay-sensitivity of accounting performance. The results hold for both firm-level industry specialist and partner-level industry specialist. The findings are consistent with the optimal contracting theory that the board of directors increases the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation when the accounting-based measure is of higher quality due to higher auditor industry expertise.