Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 國家發展研究所 === 100 === After the trend of New Public Management rised, the issues of deregulation and Small government get more and more important. When nations exercise the power of administrative inspection, increasing inspectors is not the only way to make sure people obey the...

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Main Authors: Jen-Li Lin, 林楨理
Other Authors: 趙永茂
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2012
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/p7ejvx
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spelling ndltd-TW-100NTU050110412018-04-10T17:21:48Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/p7ejvx Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry 行政檢查機制與公私協力治理─以臺北市政府降低營造業職業災害政策為例 Jen-Li Lin 林楨理 碩士 國立臺灣大學 國家發展研究所 100 After the trend of New Public Management rised, the issues of deregulation and Small government get more and more important. When nations exercise the power of administrative inspection, increasing inspectors is not the only way to make sure people obey the law. Therefore, forming the interaction networks between the government and the private industry through public-private cooperation mechanism is the key of sustainable development of administrative inspection. This research is mainly based on administrative inspection and public-private collective governance theories and conducted to deconstruct the system of labor inspection in Taiwan. Comparing with this system in Japan, comprehend the active roles of central and local governments to interprete that how Taipei reduces ambitiously the occupational injury in the construction industry, which is the high-risk occupation. Understand how Taipei integrates construction companies of different risk levels to the strategic alliance in public-private collaborative relationship by developing their ability of self-management. Through case study and analysis, probe into the interaction of governance, the strategy of collaboration, and the potential predicament between public and private sectors. Finally, after analyzing the correlation between the theories and case practice, the suggestion will be broutht up for the Taipei city government’s policy to reduce the occupational injury in the construction industry. 趙永茂 2012 學位論文 ; thesis 248 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 國家發展研究所 === 100 === After the trend of New Public Management rised, the issues of deregulation and Small government get more and more important. When nations exercise the power of administrative inspection, increasing inspectors is not the only way to make sure people obey the law. Therefore, forming the interaction networks between the government and the private industry through public-private cooperation mechanism is the key of sustainable development of administrative inspection. This research is mainly based on administrative inspection and public-private collective governance theories and conducted to deconstruct the system of labor inspection in Taiwan. Comparing with this system in Japan, comprehend the active roles of central and local governments to interprete that how Taipei reduces ambitiously the occupational injury in the construction industry, which is the high-risk occupation. Understand how Taipei integrates construction companies of different risk levels to the strategic alliance in public-private collaborative relationship by developing their ability of self-management. Through case study and analysis, probe into the interaction of governance, the strategy of collaboration, and the potential predicament between public and private sectors. Finally, after analyzing the correlation between the theories and case practice, the suggestion will be broutht up for the Taipei city government’s policy to reduce the occupational injury in the construction industry.
author2 趙永茂
author_facet 趙永茂
Jen-Li Lin
林楨理
author Jen-Li Lin
林楨理
spellingShingle Jen-Li Lin
林楨理
Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry
author_sort Jen-Li Lin
title Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry
title_short Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry
title_full Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry
title_fullStr Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry
title_full_unstemmed Administrative Inspection Agencies and Collective Goverance: A Case Study of the Taipei City Government''s Policy to Reduce Occupational Injury in the Construction Industry
title_sort administrative inspection agencies and collective goverance: a case study of the taipei city government''s policy to reduce occupational injury in the construction industry
publishDate 2012
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/p7ejvx
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