Targeting the Support or the Opposition?The Impacts of Intergovernmental Relations upon the Distribution of Governmental Grants

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 公共行政暨政策學系 === 100 ===   In view of its theoretical and practical political implications, this study focuses on the intergovernmental relations between central and local governments in Taiwan. Specifically, this study examines the allocation of central grants under two kinds of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chih-liang Wang, 王志良
Other Authors: Chung-li Wu
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01581179398396346014
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Summary:碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 公共行政暨政策學系 === 100 ===   In view of its theoretical and practical political implications, this study focuses on the intergovernmental relations between central and local governments in Taiwan. Specifically, this study examines the allocation of central grants under two kinds of the intergovernmental relations, which are vertical divided government and vertical unified government. Vertical divided government exists when the central and local governments are controlled by different political parties. On the contrary, vertical unified government implies that both the central and local governments are held by the same political party. By analyzing the grant distribution among 21 counties from 1999 to 2009, this study explores the effects of intergovernmental relations and some political factors (incumbent vote-share, the closeness of vote-share between incumbent and rival, the year before presidential election, the county magisterial/city mayoral election year, and the seat-share of incumbent legislators). In research design, this study employs the mixed research method which combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. Empirical results reveal that vertical divided government may have influences upon the allocation of central grants yet not without restriction. In short, central government would not over-reward the county held by the same party. In addition, neither election year nor the seat-share of incumbent legislators makes statistically significant differences of grant distribution. In contrast, the central government seems to see winning of presidential elections as the top priority. Financial resources tend to flow into those counties in which the incumbent encounters disadvantage or keen competition in previous presidential elections. It implies that the central government to certain extent would like to target the opposition and swinging groups. This study concludes that vertical divided government is an issue worthy of continued research by Taiwan’s political scientists.