An Analysis Of The Market Structure And Its Determinants For Commercial Banks In Major ASEAN Countries And Newly Industrialized Asian Economies Using Both Dynamic And Static Models

• Main Authors: Chang,Haojan, 張皓然
• Other Authors: Chien, Mingche
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2012
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67738359072292326486

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 100 === The purpose of this study is to analyze the market structure and its determinants of commercial banks in five major ASEAN countries and four Newly Industrialized Asian countries using both dynamic and static specifications for the period of 2002-2009. A Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) of Arellano and Bond (1991) was first applied to a dynamic Panzar-Rosse (P-R) model to test the degree of competition for all nine Asian countries. A Panel Data Analysis was then employed to the H-statistics estimated from the static P-R model to analyze the determinants of the degree of competition in Asian banking industry. Major empirical results are as follows. First, as found by Goddard and Wilson (2009), when market is in disequilibrium, traditional static P-R model is found to be biased toward zero, while the ignorance of autocorrelation will also result in a biased H statistics as well. GMM estimation results of dynamic P-R model show that banking industries of South Korea and Philippine exhibit a perfect competition market structure, while the rest countries of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam are all found to exhibit a monopoly market structure. Results above indicate that there exists no severe overbanking problem in the banking industries of nine major Asian countries. Second, estimation results of Panel Data Analysis on H statistics of static model show that the higher the market concentration and scale efficiency of Asian banking industry the larger the monopoly market power and the less competitiveness. The higher economic growth will increase bank profitability and its competitiveness. The lower the equity ratio of the banking industry indicating a higher franchise value of banks will result in a higher monopoly power. A positive direct effect of ROA on H statistics shows that the higher bank earnings will result in a higher degree of competition. However, government governance will indirectly weaken the positive effect of ROA on H statistics. At certain high degree of government governance, the effect of ROA on H statistics will even turn to negative.