| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 運籌管理研究所 === 100 === In this study, we construct a pricing model to analyze the effect of a two-layer distribution channel in a Stackelberg game manner. Under a Stackelberg game in the channel, the supplier is leader and retailers are followers, and the supplier is tend to maximize his own profits by adopting a pricing strategy to coordinate the demands from different retailers. The supplier first decides a wholesale price for the retailers, and then each retailer determines his ordering lot size in order to maximize his own profits. Based on a fundamental pricing strategy with a unique price for all the retailers, this study adopts a Two/Three Part Tariffs for the supplier in a distribution channel.
In this study, the two-layer distribution channel consists of single supplier offering a single product to a set of heterogeneous retailers. The demand of the product in the channel occurs only at the retailers, but nowhere else. The retailers in this two-layer vertical channel are independent, and have exclusive territories, i.e., all the merchandise offered directly by the supplier, and no resale and competition among retailers. Each retailer faces a unique demand curve which is a function of the retailer’s selling price. The supplier is aim to satisfy all the orders from the retailers under a wholesale price. The costs considered by each retailer include product procurement, inventory ordering and holding costs; each retailer’s ordering policy is in a form of EOQ type. A retailer’s profit is equal to his selling price minus costs of product purchasing, ordering and inventory holding. On the other hand, the supplier follows a lot-for-lot policy to replenish his own inventory. Thus, the supplier’s expanse only consists of costs of processing and delivering all the orders to the retailers. The supplier profits then can be obtained by removing all the above costs from the supplier’s selling gains.
Based on a fundamental unique price for all the retailers, this study extends the supplier’s pricing strategy to a Two/Three Part Tariffs towards the distribution channel. Rather than only a unit price for all the retailers, a Two-Part Tariffs in this research incorporates a fixed cost on the top of the unit price. Then, the Three-Part Tariffs in this research is constructed by two Two-Part Tariffs, in which each Two-Part Tariffs is valid only for a range of sales volumes.
Based on numerical examples, we first analyze the effect of the Two-Part Tariffs with various fixed costs, and then conduct a set of Three-Part Tariffs to exam the distribution channel. According to the numerical studies for the supplier’s profit, the Three-Part Tariffs gets the best performance and the Two-Part Tariffs is the next to the best. Similarly, all the retailers’ profits are improved if a Three-Part Tariffs is adopted instead of a Two-Part Tariffs since every retailer gets more freedom choosing Three-Part against Two-Part Tariffs. However, it may not be always true while comparing Two-Part Tariffs to a unit price since the fixed cost may force a retailer to change his ordering lot size due to different economic scales. As a result from the analysis and numerical examples in this thesis, adopting Two/Three-Part Tariffs can always make more profits for the supplier in the distribution channel.
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