The Impacts of Split-share Structure Reform On Cash Dividends:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 企業管理學系碩士在職專班 === 100 === Cash dividend is an important index in evaluating corporate performance. Moreover, corporate performance is strongly related to corporate governance and ownership structure. Generally, most of the studies focus on the agency problems arising from the specif...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chiao-ling Chung, 鐘巧玲
Other Authors: Jung-Hua Hung
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2012
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41319691658941380763
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 企業管理學系碩士在職專班 === 100 === Cash dividend is an important index in evaluating corporate performance. Moreover, corporate performance is strongly related to corporate governance and ownership structure. Generally, most of the studies focus on the agency problems arising from the specific type of Chinese firms’ ownership structure which is dominated by the state. However, the split-share structure reform in 2005 decreased the ratio of nontradable shares and state ownership but the research about how this reform affects the firms’ dividend policy is rare. The purpose of this study is to discuss whether the spilt-share structure reform has impacts on cash dividends of a Chinese listed corporation. We also take the elements of corporate governance including board size, percentage of outside directors, CEO duality, and elements of ownership structure including the percentage of government and legal shareholdings into our study. The sample consists of 2,322 listed companies which were listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during 2001 to 2010. We use Mean-Whitney U Test and Panel Least Squares Regression to analyze the data. The results show that: 1. the cash dividend yield has been decreased after the split-share structure reform implying that corporations are prone to retain earnings; 2. board size has positive impacts on cash dividend yield; 3. there is no evidence to support that outside directors have positive impacts on cash dividend yield; 4. CEO duality has negative impacts on cash dividend yield; 5. there is no evidence to support that the state ownership has positive impacts on cash dividend yield; 6. There is no evidence to support that the percentage of legal person ownership has positive impacts to cash dividend yield.