| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 科技法律研究所 === 100 === A “price squeeze” (or margin squeeze) is a behavior conducted by a vertically integrated firm, which has the monopoly power at the upstream level, and sells the downstream products and the upstream input to firms that compete with the vertically integrated firm at the downstream level. The effect of price squeeze is debated that the vertically integrated frim may diminish the competition in the downstream market by “squeeze” the margin between the wholesale price and the retail price, so the “equally efficient competitors” cannot survive in the downstream market.
The main objective of this article is to analyze the long-term and short-term impacts of the antitrust duty of price squeeze. The article will start from the controversial cases in the U.S. and the EU, and observe the interactions among the stakeholders in the market – the monopolist, the competitors, and the consumers – to examine the legal and industrial policies behind those cases.
In the point of view of the protection of the downstream market, when the upstream input and the downstream products could be technologically and economically used and produced by downstream competitors, the competition of the downstream market would trigger the promotion of the efficiency of the downstream production and the long-term development in the industry. Due to the complicated pro-competitive and anti-competitive impacts inherited in the price squeeze behaviors, a proper standard based on the rule of reason is needed to provide a justification on the antitrust law.
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