Structured Finance and Credit Ratings: A Continuous-Time Moral Hazard Model
碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 應用數學系數學建模與科學計算碩士班 === 100 === We analyze the impact of structured finance on underwriting practices in a continuous-time moral hazard model. We show that increased securitization may decrease underwriting standards, and hence lead to a decline in credit quality. Many investors base...
Main Authors: | Lee, Ping-Heng, 李秉恆 |
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Other Authors: | Sheu, Yuan-Chung |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2011
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84427072466048741607 |
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