Mixed Bundling and Strategic Alliance in Duopoly
碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 經濟學系 === 100 === Following the framework of Economides (1993), I consider a model where producers of complementary goods have an option to practice mixed bundling in a duopoly market. Consumers make a joint consumption for a composite good (such as a computer with an installed...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2012
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9944gb |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 經濟學系 === 100 === Following the framework of Economides (1993), I consider a model where producers
of complementary goods have an option to practice mixed bundling in a duopoly market.
Consumers make a joint consumption for a composite good (such as a computer
with an installed operating system) as well as a separate consumption for a component
good (such as computer hardware and software). I find that mixed bundling is a
dominant strategy when the composite goods are not very close substitutes. However,
when the composite goods are close enough, then no bundling would emerge as the
market equilibrium.
I also consider that producers of two component goods can form a strategic alliance
by providing a price discount to those consumers who buy two component goods as a
bundle, such as airline tickets and hotel rooms. I find that in most cases firms do not
offer a discount for a bundle due to free-riding incentives.
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