Manufacturer-Retailer Game Theoretic Model under Portfolio Contract

• Main Authors: Wan-HsinKao, 高婉馨
• Other Authors: Cheng-Chang Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2012
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/11264385494369773296

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 交通管理學系碩博士班 === 100 === Portfolio contracts have two modes to proceed the cooperative relationship in supply chain at the past literatures: (1) single seller to single buyer, (2) multiple sellers to single buyer. Most of these literatures only focus on profit maximization or cost minimization for only one of the supply chain members’ while little of literatures investigate the negotiation procedures within the supply chain. Despite of the total profit of the supply chain, this study investigates the optimal contract considering uncertainty of retailer demand and overall benefits in the single manufacturer and single retailer scenario. In this study, the mathematical model which maximizes the retailer’s expected profit is presented by the two-stage stochastic programming method and solved by the L-shaped algorithm. In the numerical analysis, we consider two scenarios to demonstrate the efficacy of the portfolio contract and use L-shaped algorithm to solve the retailer the optimal capacity allocation problem. To analyze the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer in game theoretic model, we use sensitivity analysis and L-shaped algorithm while considering the overall benefits and the impact of cooperation. As a result, we can further find optimal portfolio contract contents for both parties base on this analysis.