Effect of Political Connection and Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance in China

• Main Authors: Ming-Chieh Hsieh, 謝名傑
• Other Authors: Shuh-Chyi Doong
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2012
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21585571316889420278

碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 財務金融系所 === 100 === This research is about the effects to companies’ management achievement which are caused by the relative of Chinese politics. In addition, it contains if the difference of the agent’s target function of advantage will influence companies’ management achievement. The article uses the data from 2008 to 2010 of public traded company of Shanghai Stock Exchange to be the analytic sample. In this research, the index of management achievement is Tobin’s Q which was Chung and Pruitt brought up in 1994. Then, the result reveals that it causes negative effects to the management achievement if a government official was once an administrator and the negative slope conforms to most of records. In this aspect of ownership structure, Agency Theory is always a theme for discussion. Moreover, this research indicates the percentage of state institutional shares and companies’ management achievement is negative. Because the advantage target is unconcerned with the achievement of company which is invested, achievement is not the main reason when state institutional shares chooses or supervises the investment object. Therefore, the company, whose percentage of state institutional shares is more, has negative influences to management achievement and damages it. Furthermore, if it owns private institutional shares, it also causes negative effects to companies’ management achievement. On the contrary, insider ownership doesn’t have any influence to companies’ management achievement. Besides, if a chairman is also a general manager, it will not influence companies’ management achievement.