Empirical Study of The Association Between Corporate Performance, Structure of Board of Directors, and External Corporate Governance Mechanisms to Financial Institution CEO Turnovers under different organizational structure and environment

• Main Authors: Chen-An Lu, 盧貞安
• Other Authors: Hou,Ou-Yang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2012
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98644552043661177055

碩士 === 崑山科技大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 100 === This paper takes 412 financial institutions listed from 2003 to 2010 in Taiwan as the samples(During the research period, 14 of the listed financial holding companies and 34~43 non-financial holding companies in Taiwan adopt calendar year. Moreover, during 2003~2010, samples of 48~57 financial insurance and securities were researched by this study. ) 412 samples of observed values were obtained for subsequent analysis, among which financial holding companies account for 112 observed values(27.2% of all the financial samples), non-financial holding companies account for 300 observed values(72.8%); and 113 samples for CEO turnover(27.42%)- leave out the situation of more than one turnovers in the same company within one year, among which, the financial holding companies take up 29 samples(25.89%), the non-financial holding companies take up 84 samples(28%), accounting for 25.65% and 74.35% of all turnover samples respectively, a much higher ratio than that of the non-financial industries during the same period. The major motives and purposes of this study are as the follows. First, to verify whether poor performance is the main cause for the CEO turnovers in financial institutions(including financial holding companies and non-financial holding companies), and when the corporate operation performance keeps dropping, whether the possibility of turnover will increase in order to improve the operation performance. Second, to explore whether the three composition variables of board of directors, i.e., the shareholding ratio of the CEO, the kin identity of CEO in the family-controlled group, board chairman is or not also the CEO, are negatively related to the turnover probability of the CEO, and whether the bigger the board the more significantly it affects the turnover probability of the CEO. Third, to verify whether the two composition variables of the external governance mechanism, ie, the supervision function of independent director or supervisor of the board meeting in the financial institutions, and supervision of the large external shareholders and institutions, can reduce the adverse effects the shareholding ratio of the CEO, the kin identity of CEO in the family-controlled group, the fact that the board chairman is also the CEO, and the an over-sized board cast on the turnover probability of the CEO; and to discuss whether the external governance mechanism can effectively increase the turnover probability of ineligible CEOs. Four, on one hand, to explore whether the 10 variables under the above mentioned three major dimensions show different impacts on the CEO turnover in different organizational patterns- financial holding companies and non-financial holding companies; on the other hand, to divide the study period into two stages of stable period(2003~2006) and fluctuant period(2007~2010) in order to discuss whether the 10 variables under the above mentioned three major dimensions show different impacts on the CEO turnover in different stages and in different organizational patterns- financial holding companies and non-financial holding companies.