| Summary: | 碩士 === 華梵大學 === 工業工程與經營資訊學系碩士班 === 100 === In the present study, we aim to analyze the effects of varying number of downstream retailers and their entry timing(simultaneous or sequential) on the following variables. The primary one is the upstream monopolist’s intermediate good pricing. The additional ones are the producers’ profits, retailers’ profits, final good prices, and total output. To explore the effects, a pricing-quantity game structure of two-echelon supply chain is established.
Through mathematical analysis, this study has the following conclusions: the formula of DeGraba’s(1990) discriminatory pricing of intermediate goods is invariant to the varying number of downstream retailers (two firms, three firms, n firms) and their entry timing (simultaneously or sequentially); namely, the price of intermediate goods will increase as the marginal cost of downstream retailer gets higher. Furthermore, the price discrimination of intermediate goods will enhance the producer’s profits, but the retailer’s profits and social welfare will be better off when uniform pricing is adopted.
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