The Effects of Minimum Wage on Collusion

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 經濟學系碩士班 === 99 === This thesis studies the possibilities of collusion by considering both of the market''s demand and supply side fluctuating. Most previous literature ignore the effects of supply factors on collusion such as cost increased since the implementation...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Shang-Tien Tsai, 蔡尚典
Other Authors: 林彥伶
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69270803886680930246
Description
Summary:碩士 === 淡江大學 === 經濟學系碩士班 === 99 === This thesis studies the possibilities of collusion by considering both of the market''s demand and supply side fluctuating. Most previous literature ignore the effects of supply factors on collusion such as cost increased since the implementation of minimum wage, while the minimun wage may cause a stronger incentive for firms to collude. With using the firm-level data in manufacturing and service industries in Taiwan,we find that firms collude significantly when the minimum wage is increased, and we also find that business cycle has weaker effects on collusion. In addition,even if the market concentration is lower, the firms still have stronger opossibility to collude due to the increased minimum wage.