The Effect of Budgetary Participative on Budgetary Dysfunctional Behavior --The Role of Information Asymmetry and Organizational Commitment

• Main Authors: Cheng, Wan-Ju, 鄭婉茹
• Other Authors: Tsai, Huey-cherng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 99
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62733103115159346531

碩士 === 南台科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 99 === This study explored how this relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack was affected by the information asymmetry and organizational commitment. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 123 subunit production randomly selected from publicly-owned manufacturing companies in Taiwan. The results indicated that there was a significant three-way interaction effect among budgetary participation, information asymmetry and organizational commitment on budgetary slack. In high information asymmetry situations, high budgetary participation is associated with a high budgetary slack, regardless of the level of organizational commitment. The organizational commitment could reduce the extent of budgetary slack that created by budgetary participation, but not all. Before decided to practice budgetary participation, the enterprise should consider the level of information asymmetry first. In high information asymmetry situations, it is necessary to improve the level of organizational commitment of subordinates, otherwise , budget participation will harm the performance of organization.