| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 經濟學系 === 99 === This paper compares VCG auction and the Ausubel auction with experimental method. We also design different synergy structures as controls, two units of the same goods could be substitute, compliment, or independent. We conduct a total of eight echelons of exepriment, with 138 auctions and 96 subjects. Before deleting sessions with unsold items, the efficiency ratio, revenue ratio and payoffs ratios of the two auctions systems are quite close. However, after deleting these sessions, we find the efficiency ratios are still not very different, but the revenues are slightly higher in Ausubul auction and the payoff ratios are higher in VCG auction. We also find different synergy structures leads to different action results. The efficiency and payoff ratios are significantly lower for complimentary goods with positive synergy. We run regression with VCG experimental data and find 5.19% of the bids were left blank. After deleting these zero bids, the bids were very close to the true valuation but not exactly the same.
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