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• Main Authors: Shin-wen Huang, 黃信文
• Other Authors: Ruey-ji Guo
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56594248403433483669

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 99 === The agency theory has been widely applied in various situations so far. Since the agent has more information than the principle, which causes the information asymmetry and becomes the main reason of the agency problems. We discuss how to protect the interests of principle under the premise that information asymmetry exists between the principle and agent in this study. In order to deter the agent’s lying behavior, the principle may consider establishing a monitoring system, and hiring auditors to investigate the agent's declaration. If auditors find the under-declaration of return, the agent has to pay penalties. Up to now, the previous literatures have been discussed in a two-period audit scenario. It would naturally make us considering that the agent may unscrupulous choose to be profitiable under-declaring as the second period that is the last period. Therefore, it is worthy to further explore that if we add a period in the middle of the previous two periods, and examine the influence on the principle’s audit policy and the agent’s declaration. The results of our research indicate that, as long as the operating results show high return in under, the premise incentive of under-declaration is outstanding, and the agent will choose to declare low return, at this time, the punitive audit policy will not bring deterrent. Furthermore, when the principle adopts the「full audit」policy, the biggest reward occurs, and the punitive conditional audit will have no space to be manipulated.