The Relationship between External Governance Mechanisms and Long-run Performance: The Evidence from Bank Loan Announcing Firms

• Main Authors: Tz-Hua Chen, 陳姿樺
• Other Authors: Wen-Chun Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42123189322249484535

碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 財務金融學系 === 99 === The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between the external governance mechanisms and long-run performance of post-announcing bank loan in American firms for the period during 1997 to 2005. This study use antitakeover provisions to proxy the external governance. This paper expected the weaker antitakeover provisions (stronger external governance mechanisms) will reduce the agency problems and then increase firm value. The results present that borrowing firms with greater (lower) antitakeover provisions would have less (greater) long-run abnormal returns. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports that shareholders’ right significantly related with post-borrowing stock performance.