| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 應用經濟學系碩士班 === 99 === In this thesis, we first reconsider the welfare effect of entry in a vertical structure with production efficiency, and then further explore the strategic trade and industrial policies in such framework.
The first chapter considers entry in a successive Cournot oligopoly where the entrant in final goods market is less production efficiency than the incumbent producers, and investigates how the production inefficiency affects the social welfare. It shows that there is a parametric space allowing potential entrant with production inefficiency, which is affected by the number of input producers and final-good producers. The critical value of entry condition range rise when the number of input producers is decreasing, and the number of final-goods producer is increasing; however, the welfare under entry is always higher than the welfare under non-entry, if the entrant enters the market.
The second chapter considers the two-country model in which there are two firms with production inefficiency in the downstream country, one upstream firm in the other country. The upstream monopolist may charge the uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. It shows that the tariff policy dominates the subsidy policy with lower production inefficiency under uniform pricing, however, when the production inefficiency is higher, the optimal policy is production subsidy. Under discriminatory pricing scheme, the optimal policy is an import tariff, and the welfare effect of production inefficiency in vertical structure is negligible.
The third chapter extends the previous two–country model into a four-country setting in which there is one upstream firm in foreign country, two downstream firms with production inefficiency in each country, and there is one import country. The upstream firm may charge the uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. It shows that, with uniform pricing, the optimal policy for both domestic country and foreign rival is the import tariff policy. Under discriminatory pricing scheme, both domestic country and foreign rival adopt the same trade policy from welfare point of view regardless of production efficiency.
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