Knight不確定性下的競爭性保險市場

• Main Authors: Guo, Jen-Fei, 郭任斐
• Other Authors: Pan,Wan-Hsiang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41534098765596320434

碩士 === 國立清華大學 === 經濟學系 === 99 === We use Bewley’s (1986) notion of Knightian uncertainty to reexamine competitive insurance market analysis of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In the symmetric information case, there may be multiple equilibria, and the equilibrium insurance contracts depend on endowment, probability of accident and loss of an accident, which is in contrast to the result that consumers would always choose full insurance contract in a competitive insurance market as predicted by the analysis relying on expected utility theory. When insurance companies cannot observe insuree’s probability of accident, we find that a pooling equilibrium would not exist, separating equilibrium would exist under some circumstances, and, different from the Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) result, the insurance company may offer full- or over-insurance contract to low risk consumers.